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by itself, . . . but just any point at which it occurs to us to ask ourselves: What is it you know, and how do you know it?" A second, and still deeper, root of the wrong conception of a soul presupposed by the analogy argument he finds in the "instinct for adding." As a primitive physical science added to a body another called heat to produce the hot body, so we add to a body another, called soul, to make it a live body, we compose a real sweetheart out of an automatic sweetheart plus an eject. Physical science has outgrown this stage. Soul is still considered a mystery by philosophers. "Is it not time to recognize the meaninglessness of the mystery?" Professor Ormond took exception to Professor Singer's view of life.

In the concluding paper of the meeting, "Some Problems confronting the Intellectualist," Professor Shaw showed the historical development of activism and its effect on intellectualism. This influence concerns the framing of the problem of reality and the formulation of the doctrine of truth. Starting with the distinction between appearance and reality, Professor Shaw showed that the intellectualist may conceive of being as that which appears and acts; "being is expected to exist *in sensu, in actu, et in re.*" The Lockean formula should be modified so as to read: *nihil est in intellectu quod non ante fuerit in actu.* This theory of reality finds support on the psychological side in Wundt's theory of attention and in Judd's conception of "active behavior and conscious experience as complementary forms of the ego's existence." The new theory of truth emphasizes the rôle of human interest, whether, like Eucken, in the form of a "spiritual creativeness," or "along the path of instinct," where Bergson seeks truth. Professor Shaw pointed out dangers in this theory, but concluded that the intellectualist ought to admit that "there is truth in desire," as well as that there is "reality in activity."

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REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

Natural and Social Morals. CARVETH READ. London: Adam and Charles Black. 1909.

The title of this book is intended to be descriptive. Morality is natural to man "in the sense that it is necessary not merely to his existence, but to the development of all that is distinctively human." And morality is social because man, in respect both of his existence and his development, is essentially social. No exception can be taken to this contention, and it gives to the whole book a certain pertinence and liveliness that are lacking in many ethical treatises. But the author's other preliminary

contention, that his ethical system rests logically on the metaphysical system developed in his "Metaphysics of Nature," is more questionable. Apparently the only application that Professor Read makes of his idealistic metaphysics is the inference that because "science is the interpretation of the world according to the principle of causality," it follows that "if morality is to be scientifically treated, it must be brought under the principle of causality." But this inference, barring the contention that the principle of causality somehow depends upon the "nature of the human mind," is not idealistic doctrine at all. The idealistic motive in modern ethics appears rather in the tendency to distinguish moral judgments from scientific judgments through setting up a dualism between "appreciation" and "description," or the "normative" and the "factual." And no one has repudiated such a dualism more explicitly than has Professor Read. Thus he says: Moral science differs from the natural sciences "not in the quality of its laws but in the limitation of its scope by the end in view" (p. 95). And again: "Moral science is not a system of rules, but a science of the tendencies of actions: which being known, every one must judge what he ought to do" (p. 99). Such assertions as these bring Professor Read into agreement, not with idealists like Green, Bradley, and Mackenzie, but with realists like G. E. Moore, in whose "Principia Ethica" we read that the question, What ought we to do, "introduces into ethics . . . the question what things are related as *causes* to that which is good in itself; and this question can only be answered by . . . the method of empirical investigation; by means of which causes are discovered in the other sciences" (p. 146).

Where virtue and duty are construed in terms of the consequences or tendencies of actions, the concept of the good assumes fundamental importance. Here the author is in agreement with the tendency which dominates modern ethics, to construe goodness in terms of desire. But his account of the matter is on the whole confused and unsuccessful. In the first place, he argues that because the good is the object of desire it must therefore consist in some "experience." Now accepting the necessary connection between desire and goodness, goodness may be defined either as that which satisfies desire, or as the satisfaction itself. But it is impossible to identify the two and assert that a desire is satisfied by its own satisfaction. And if the good is that which satisfies desire, then there is no proof that it need be experience; while if the good is the satisfaction of desire, then it is inaccurate to identify goodness with the object of desire. But this is perhaps more a matter of clearness than of doctrine. A more serious difficulty arises in connection with the account of the "chief good," which is the basal conception of the whole system. The author nowhere analyzes this conception, and he does not appear to recognize that because it predicates some kind of quantitative maximum of the generic goodness already defined, it must derive its exact meaning from the category of quantity which is employed. Everything, in other words, turns upon the term "chief," which the author uses with the naïveté of common sense. He assumes, apparently, that if the good is the desired, the chief good is the most desired; or that the chief good is what is pre-

ferred. The difficulty, of course, lies in the fact that a great many different and contradictory things are preferred, so that we are nowhere afforded any ground upon which to establish a true judgment in the matter. Professor Read does not even employ the ordinary idealistic device of referring to an absolute judgment. Were he to do so, we should as moralists be compelled to ask for the grounds of such a judgment, and should not be at all interested in it as a metaphysical or epistemological hypothesis. And Professor Read must at least be credited with avoiding irrelevant issues, even though he fails to solve the problem; but that he does fail, can scarcely be denied. We are told of some of the things which men have thought to be the chief good, "namely happiness, perfection, virtue, the beauty of holiness and wisdom"; and it is suggested that the best term under which to comprise them all ("if one term must be chosen") is "philosophy or culture." But why the author should feel compelled to choose one term when he has not succeeded in discovering a single conception, does not appear. We are left at the end without the slightest idea of what the author is really looking for, or where he expects such a thing to be found. The whole discussion rests upon a vague appeal to the actual preferences of men, in other words, to opinion; and is easily convertible into the crudest relativism. Against the relativism of Westermarck he feels it necessary to protest, "as the alternative to abandoning moral philosophy" (p. 129). But what does it profit moral philosophy to save the subordinate conception of virtue or right action from the taint of subjectivity, unless it be possible to establish the principal conception of goodness upon objective grounds?

Doubtless it is Professor Read's failure to recognize the seriousness of the logical problem that leads him to speak so slightly of Kant, as one who identifies "duty with the command of an abstract Prussian drill-sergeant" (p. 54); and to dismiss the term "ought" as unanalyzable "because it is empty" (p. 57). He is entirely correct in distinguishing the "feeling and impulse" of duty from the rational conviction of duty, and in charging tradition with confusing the two. But Professor Read seems scarcely to understand that Kant and others have been brought to their excessive formalism by their painstaking treatment of a matter that he himself glosses over. If moral scepticism is to be avoided it is necessary that moral experience should somehow be enabled to escape the limits of the individual consciousness; it is necessary that the fundamental judgment in moral matters should partake of the logical virtue of objective truth. And Kant's notion of a "practical reason," artificial and needless though it doubtless is, can scarcely be dismissed by one who has nothing better to put in its place than composite opinion.

Nearly two-thirds of the book is devoted to the discussion of custom, the family, the state, religion, and art. These chapters are interestingly written, and contain an abundance of information and sound critical comment. A pessimistic tone pervades them all, and this is most pronounced in the last chapter, which he significantly terms "moral degeneracy," rather than "progress." Professor Read is evidently an individualist who is somewhat out of sympathy with an age in which men habitually look to

the state for succor. But he is not bitter, nor is he over-positive. Indeed the author's willingness to leave important matters unsettled, to accumulate evidence without striking a balance, and to offer opinions without proof, is at once the principal defect and the principal merit of the book. It is not to be compared with such a book as Moore's "*Principia Ethica*" in logical rigor, nor with such a book as Simmel's "*Einleitung*" in refinement of analysis, nor with such a book as Rashdall's "*Theory of Good and Evil*" in systematic arrangement and completeness. But, on the other hand, it surpasses all of these books not only in style, but in the trenchancy and aptness of its criticism of life. Its very inadequacy as a treatise in theoretical ethics may have something to do with its success as an "endeavor to study morals as matter of fact and experience, instead of merely worrying the traditionary abstract ideas in the fashion of a scholastic age" (p. xi).

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Le cycle mystique: la divinité, origine et fin des existences individuelles dans la philosophie antésocratique. AUGUSTE DIÈS. Paris: Felix Alcan. 1909. Pp. 115.

The volume under notice belongs to the series "Collection historique des grands philosophes." It falls into two parts, of which the first considers the religious origins of the conception of deity as source and goal of all existences. In two chapters M. Diès treats (1) of the "classical" religion, that is, the religion of classic Greek literature beginning with Homer, or what is more familiarly known as the Olympian religion, and (2) of the primitive religion, of which the Dionysiac and Orphic cults are survivals or revivals. These chapters are extremely well done, presenting in brief compass probably as satisfactory a statement of Greek religion before the Hellenistic period as may anywhere be found. There are points, to be sure, at which the student of Greek religion will hesitate to adopt the views of M. Diès, as when he regards Homeric religion as essentially a religion of art, and explains the flexibility of fate (p. 10) and the tendency of the epic to portray the gods as of like passions with ourselves (p. 11), as due to the exigencies of art. One may gladly recognize that without such conceptions the Homeric epic, as we know it, would have been impossible; but that would be quite another thing from admitting that such considerations begot the conceptions in question. These are but two of a number of similar points; but they do not greatly detract from one's favorable judgment of the presentation as a whole.

The chapters of the second part, which deal with the teachings of the pre-Socratic philosophers touching this view of the world, are rather perfunctory, excepting that in which M. Diès treats of Empedocles. Xenophanes and Heraclitus might perhaps be included in this exception, but only if one takes a narrow view of the theme. The chief shortcoming of the thesis is that the author did not perceive that, in the last resort, he was dealing with the large question of the "one and the many." If